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CHAPTER TWO

THE DISCOVERY OF QUANTUM MECHANICS

SECTION I: WERNER HEISENBERG AND QUANTUM MECHANICS 1

Introduction
The insight which led Heisenberg in 1925 to the formulation of
quantum mechanics was in some respects as momentous as the
Copernican insight into the ordering of the heavenly bodies; for it
changed the point of perspective from which physicists since the time
of Copernicus were accustomed to look at the world. It changed a
viewpoint about the world which had become classical and tumbled
down a pile of certainties on which the physics' three hundred years
had been based. Heisenberg called these
ontology of materialism",
that is, the certainty that nature was out there, solid and material,
infinitely accessible to objective description, in which the goal of each
succeeding generation of scientists was the conguering of yet another
decimal place 2. Quantum mechanics showed
this goal was a
mirage; it revealed the presence of a subtle subjectivity at the very
heart of the scientific enterprise, and, by so robbing the mind of its
solid support, left it as Heisenberg said, "suspended as over an un
fathomable abyss" – the unfathomable and mysterious abyss of its
own subjectivity 3. Even in the moment of its conception, Heisenberg,
Bohr and the small circle of intimates who surrounded them, knew that
the structure of quantum mechanics was of critical importance for more
than scientific method. They realized that it destroyed one ontology of
nature and profoundly affected the science of the intimate structure of
the human mind.
1 We intend to use the terms "quantunl mechanics" or "matrix mechanics" for Heisen
berg's theory of 1925; "wave mechanics" for Schrödinger's theory of 1926, and "quantum
theory" as a term of general meaning applicable to both.
2 W. Heisenberg, The Physicist's Conception of Nature, (London: 1958) p. 14.
3 W. Heisenberg, Philosophic Problems of Nuclear Science, (London: 1952), p. 117.
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Quantum mechanics
It is our intention to use Werner Heisenberg as our guide to the
philosophical world of quantum physics, since he was both one of its
founders and one of its most profound interpreters. He was one of the
many who, in the decade of
were busy with the problem of
trying to reconcile quantum phenomena with the traditional physics
of Newton, Maxwell and Laplace. Traditional physics was a very proud
and impressive scientific structure. It was endowed at that time with
an authority derived chiefly from its logical splendour, which made it
a norm not merely for all science, but for all rational thinking.
Traditional physics was not just a particular view of physics which
might itself be subject to revision. It was classical physics. It was,
therefore, with an experience like that of a conversion, that physicists
found themselves turning inward to examine critically the revered
foundations of what they and their colleagues had believed in for three
hundred years.
Many of the original founders of the quantum theory have told us
about the transition that was then taking
in physics. Some
accounts date from the early days of hectic and almost evangelical
enthusiasm; others were written in retrospect and in a calmer mood.
But all conveyed the conviction that as a result of the discoveries of
that decade man had reached a new level of consciousness about the
world, himself and the horizon of human knowing 1.
The first successful synthesis of quantum
classical physics was
made by Heisenberg in the summer of 1925 His ideas were taken up
immediately by Born, Jordan and Dirac who helped to bring them to
1 The principal accounts of the events of this period recounted by Bohr and Heisenberg
are: N. Bohr, "Die Entstehung der Quantenmechanik", in Werner Heisenberg und die Physik
unserer Zeit (Braunschweig : 1961), IX-XII; and "Discussions with Einstein on Epistemological
Problems in Atomic Physics", in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (New York : Library
of Living Philosophers, 1949), 199-242; W. Heisenberg, "Quantenmechanik" Nobel Prize
address, in Les
Nobel en I933 (Stockholm: 1935); " Fünfzig Jahre Quantentheorie",
Naturwissen., XXXVIII (1951), 49-55; "Erinnerungen an die Zeit der Entwicklung der
Quantenmechanik" in Theoretical Physics
the Twentieth Century, a Memorial Volume to
Wolfgang Pauli, ed. by M. Fierz and V. F . Weisskopf (New York : Interscience, 1960).
2 Werner Carl Heisenberg was born in Würzburg on the 5th of December, 1901. He
studied physics at Munich under Sommerfeld, Wien, Pringsheim and Rosenthal, entering
the university in 1920. During the winter term of 1922-23, he studied under Born, Frank and
Hilbert in Gottingen. He obtained his Ph. D. at Munich in 1923, and his venia legendi
(Habilitation) at Gottingen in the following year. In the winter of 1924-25, he was Rockefeller
Scholar under Bohr at Copenhagen. In 1926 he was appointed lecturer in theoretical physics
at the University of Copenhagen. In 1927 he became Prof. Ord. of theoretical Physics at the
University of Leipzig. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1933. He became Director of the
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, Berlin in 1941, and Prof. Ord. at the University of Berlin. In 1946
he helped to found the Max Planck Institute for Physics in Gottingen. He is now Director of
the Max-Planck Institut fiir Physik und Astrophysik, Munich.
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near logical completion within a year. Schrödinger, working on the
ideas of de Broglie, published his celebrated theory of wave mechanics
in the spring of 1926, followed soon by a proof of the equivalence of
his theory with that of Heisenberg. Within a year, the permanent lines
of a new physics were drawn.
The most detailed and authoritative account of the germination of the
ideas which constituted quantum mechanics was written by Heisen
berg himself for the memorial volume, Theoretical Physics in the
Twentieth Century, and dedicated to the memory of Wolfgang Pauli 1.
It was written while Pauli was still alive but, by the time of its publi
cation in 1960, Pauli was already dead. In this detailed account of the
course and development of his thought in those days, full of personal
reminiscences and documented by extracts from his letters of that
period, Heisenberg singles out Pauli as his principal confidant and
correspondent in the dialogue preceding the fruition which took place
in his mind in the summer of 1925.
The questions which were in the air at that time among physicists
were three: the anomalous Zeeman effect due to electron spin, the
Exclusion Principle, and the foundations of what is now called, the
old quantum theory. This was the quantum theory of Bohr and the
wave-particle dualism of de Broglie. It was generally thought then
that these three questions were connected parts of one problem. As it
turned out, however, they were separate questions, each contributing
in its way to the overthrow of the scientific
ofclassical physics 2.
As we are principally interested in the change in intentionality
marking a shift in the noetic orientation of the physicist-Heisenberg,
we shall start at the logical terminus a quo, namely, the intentention
ality-structure characteristic of the classical physics.

SECTION II:
INTENTIONALITY STRUCTURE OF CLASSICAL

Classical physics is characterised by a naively realist outlook (called
"materialist" by Heisenberg) towards physical reality. The physical
reality envisaged by the intentionality-structure of classical physics
is one made up of the kind of parts which are objectifiable in Space
W. Heisenberg, Erinnerungen usw., loco cit.
Cf., for example, Sir Edmund Whittaker, History of the Theories of Aether and Electricity,
I900-I926 (London: Nelson, 1953).
1

2
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and Tinle. The outlook of classical physics then implies certain philo
sophical doctrines about (a) objectivity, (b) causality and (c) reality.
(a) The physical object has empirical objectivity. It is a Gegenstand,
situated out there,
the observer 1. The relationship between
noema and noesis is one of exteriority with respect to the knowing
subject. For most classical physicists, the physical real is a body
situated outside them and outside all observers as such in a determinate
part of space and time. It possesses that kind of empirical objectivity
we called bodily objectivity. It is made up of parts which, no matter
how small they may be, can be represented in a determinate fashion in
space. It is composed then of parts which are in turn composed of
- disappear
smaller parts until the smallest parts - if there are
below the threshold of measurement, observatiop or empirical intui
tion. However, since the parts at this stage, even though no longer
capable of being given in perception, can still be thought about, they
are ideal bodies, the content of a concept constructed as a limiting case
of what is given in experience. There are two such linliting cases: a
classical particle and a classical field. The former has position but no
magnitude; the latter is conceived to be an infinitely extended medium
like a hypostatised space with just sufficient
to sustain
vibratory motions.
It should be noted that Kant – the great philosopher of classical
physics – was unwilling to allow the scientific object more than
phenomenal objectivity since he believed
the realm of the thing
in-itself was unattainable by natural science. The influence of Kant's
transcendental critique was not generally felt by the majority of
physicists; its effect, however, in the period of crisis which was to
accompany the discovery of quantum mechanics was profound.
(b) Physical objects are linked by the kind of causality which
regulates their appearances in strict and orderly sequences of ante
cedent-consequent. For most physicists this causality was between
real bodies and could be called bodily causality. The follower of Kant
would see in it no more than phenomenal causality. The complete
expression of this point of view is the physical law of causality, which
is expressed as follows: "When all determinations which describe the
present state of an isolated system are known, then the future of the
system can be calculated" 2.
1 Cf. A. Dondeyne, La différence ontologique chez M. Heidegger (Louvain, Inst. Sup. de
Phil.) p. I r.
2 W. Heisenberg, "Kausalgesetz und Quantenmechanik",
II (1931), pp.
172-182; quotation is on p. 174.

DISCOVERY

27

(c) The physical object has the public objectivity of a concept, i.e. it
is one which is represented conceptually in the same way by everyone.
It has, then a determinate description or definition which leaves no
element to be completed by private acts of observation. Public
objectivity in this sense is also in the classical world-view a criterion
of physical reality: it is, accordingly, a rationalism in which the
meaning of "reality" is the content of an infinitely precise conceptual
definition from which is excluded whatever is represented by the vague
and imprecise elements recorded by concrete empirical intuition; "re
ality" means "what can be precisely defined even to an infinity of
decimal places". This almost Platonist notion of reality dehumanised
and taken out of its context in a World of real beings is what Heidegger
called Vorhandenheit 1. This is itself one of the extremes in the dialectic
of being in Western philosophy; it is the end of one
of thought
and the beginning of another which was to be set in motion by the
discovery of the quantum theory; for the first immediate effect of the
quantum theory was to reinstate the immediate object of empirical
intuition in the centre of science and to focus attention on the material,
individual, incommunicable and concrete object of experience as part
– and, to many as the whole - of the true object of scientific knowledge.
The classical notion of what constituted a real physical thing and
object of physics was founded upon a Cartesian Mind-Body Parallelism
in which Mind was thought to "reflect" Matter as in a "mirror" 2. The
classical scientist, then, got to know reality by
infinitely precise
this image within him. All that was obscure, indeterminate or indistinct
was eliminated as coming from the subject; secondary qualities like
colour, taste, etc., were excluded by this criterion. Only the primary
qualities of extension and its derivatives were accepted as objective
elements of reality, and these only in so far as they were idealised
through the assignment of infinitely exact numerical values, which were
accepted as belonging to the thing in itself and not to the representation
of the thing. The fund of possible physical realities, then,
made up
of whatever could be represented by idealised imaginative models. These
were limiting cases of phenomenal objects to which corresponded the
three divisions of classical realities: classical particles, structures made
up of classical particles and classical fields. In summary, then, the
1 Dondeyne, op. cit., p . 20, where the author refers to paragraphs 19, 2 0 and 22 of
Heidegger's Sein und Zeit.
2 W. Heisenberg, "The Origins of the Mechanistic and Materialistic World-View" and
"The Crisis of the Mechanistic-Materialistic Conception", Physicist's Conception ot Nature,
pp. 121-179.
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classical physicist oriented himself to the construction of idealised and
objectifiable phenomenal objects, i.e. concretely, to an explanation in
terms of classical particles, spatially constructed models and classical
fields 1. We have called this the intentionality-structure of classical
physics.
Out of this account the main theme of our study arises. This is an
analysis of the various kinds of objectivity in modern quantum physics
with a view to separating the scientific object from the forms imposed
upon it by human knowing, and with a view to studying critically the
possible link between the scientific object and reality.
'

SECTION III:
CRISIS OF THE CLASSICAL INTENTIONALITY-STRUCTURE

Crisis
The three problematic areas of quantum physics, viz, spin, the
exclusion principle and the failure of the old quantum theory, could not
be reconciled with the picture of reality given by classical physics. Spin
was a mysterious new dimension. The exclusion principle forbade for
no clear reason the duplication of like bodies. The old quantum theory,
while satisfying the classical criteria of objectivity, nevertheless allowed
the electron within the atom to violate well-established classicallaws.
Moreover, it was found that the old
theory which gave good
results when applied to the hydrogon atom,' failed in most other cases
and notably when applied to the hydrogen molecule.
Heisenberg, recounting with scrupulous care the source of his ideas,
says that in October, 1923, Pauli was the source for him of a great light
on the meaning of physics: model representations, Pauli said, had in
principle "only a symbolic sense", they were "classical analogues for
a 'discrete' quantum theory" 2. The remark was momentous, not
because it attacked any physical result, but because it attacked the
intentionality-structure which supported classical physics and which
hitherto was accepted as the only reasonable dynamic structure
capable of generating a valid physical theory. The consequences of this
I:,

1 Although the classical object was conceived to be something in the three-dimensional
space of our experience, it was not an object of perception in the rich emotive personal way
of everyday life. It was already a very abstract construction. It was because of this that
Goethe and the humanists of this century and the last have cried out against the claims
of physical science to represent reality truly . Cf., Heisenberg, Philosophic Problems etc.,
pp. 60-76, and C. F. von Weizsäcker, The World View of Nature, pp. 93-94 .
2 Heisenberg, Erinnerungen usw., loco cit.
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change in viewpoint were profound. If the phenomenal object is only
a symbol of reality, then reality is what lies "behind" the symbol and
may possibly be unknowable. The swing away from rationalism had
begun. It opened the
to the two extremes between which philoso
phers of physics have since been divided: Empiricism or Empiricistic
Positivism on the one hand, which denies the possibility of an ontology
of nature, and Subjectivism on the other hand, which sought the
meaning of reality in evolving noetic experience alone, apart from a
transcendent reality revealed through it. Heisenberg certainly rejected
the former, and Pauli with him in all probability. The philosophy to
which Heisenberg eventually settled down was a Kantian-style
Idealism in which a tenuous thread linked the noetic experience to an
unknowable noumenal term.
A Physics of "Observables"
The great insight which brought about the discovery of quantum
mechanics was that physics should concern itself only with observable
quantities. The insight came to him in May, 1925, as he was about to
leave for a vacation in Heligoland. During the month of June on
Heligoland he sketched the application of his
to the anharmonic
oscillator and found that it worked. This was the subject of his first
paper on quantum mechanics, submitted to the Zeitschrift
Physik,
and was received by the editor on 29 July 1925 1.
The content of that insight was remarkable
merely because it
inaugurated a new era in physics and a new intentionality-structure in
science, but because, important as it was, its precise content eludes
definition. It has an air of deceptive simplicity. At first sight, it has
all the appearance of a refreshingly clear, matter of fact, down-to-earth
statement which delights the practical man by cutting away the myth
and mystification of an entrenched tradition. And it was in this sense
that it inspired a kind of iconoclastic uprising among the young,
Out
positivistically inclined physicists whose evangelical motto
with metaphysics and all unobservable quantities!".
closer in
spection however shows that Heisenberg's basic insight was one of
Teutonic complexity of whose meaning and implications Heisenberg
himself was not fully aware. We shall try to bring out some of these
implications and use them to throw light on the main problem of this
thesis.
1 W. Heisenberg, "Ueber quantentheoretische Umdeutung kinematischer und mecha
nischer Beziehungen", Zeit. f. Physik, XXXIII (1925), pp. 879-893.
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Heisenberg wrote to Pauli in a letter of 24 June 19 2 5 about his
master-idea: "Grundsatz ist bei der Berechnung von irgendwelchen
Grossen, wie Energie, Frequenz usw., dürfen wir nur Beziehungen
zwischen prinzipiell beobachtbaren Grossen vorkommen" 1. The basic
principle, he says, is to consider only relations between observable
magnitudes, that is, between magnitudes which could in theory be
observed.
But what is an observable? Taking the term in an unqualified sense,
an observable is whatever can manifest itself immediately in ex
perience, like heat (as felt), colour (as seen), sound (as heard), etc.
At first sight, this seems to be what Heisenberg means when he criti
cises intra-atomic electron orbits as "lacking intuitive foundation" 2.
However, it was not Heisenberg's wish to deny the three hundred
years of physics based upon the mathematisation of qualities as
measured in order to return to a pre-Galilean or Aristotelian physics
based upon qualities as sensed. What stimulated Heisenberg's insight
was the recognition that certain variables, like the intra-atomic
electron orbits, appearing in the old quantum theory, were not measur
able. They were, in fact, not even imaginable, for the imagination
cannot picture radii of 10-8 cm. The electron orbits were limiting cases
of the imaginable and so were concepts. But in so far as imaginative
representations are used, these were merely
symbols of
something that escaped the power both of imagination and of measure
ment. Was it, however, the absence ofa
of them or the failure
both-which made
of measurement technique-for the electron
them unobservable? We argue that it was not the mere absence of a true
image; for Heisenberg continued to speak of the "observation of
electrons in an atom" 3. Many physical properties, like magnetic field,
the polarization of light, etc., produce no specifically recognisable
effect directly on the senses or imagination; they have no true image.
Their essence is in the way they influence other things and it is not
important that they should be capable of being experienced directly.
We conclude then that observable and unobservable are to be defined
with reference to measurability.
Measurability, however, is a complex notion. It involves an inter
action with a measuring instrument capable of yielding macroscopic
sensible data, and a theory capable of explaining what it is that is
Heisenberg, Erinnerungen usw., lac. cit.
Heisenberg, Zeit f. Physik, XXXIII (1925), p. 879.
3 W . Heisenberg, The
Principles of the Quantum Theory. (Chicago : Univ. of
Chicago, 1930), p. 64; the same point is also implied in the article we are considering.
1

2
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measured and why the sensible data are observable symbols of it.
Heisenberg's notion of observability involves all these points implicitly.
The explicit dominant factor in his mind was the necessity of giving a
physical quantity an "intuitive foundation" in the measuring process.
In what sense do the sensible data give an "intuitive foundaiton" to
the measured quantity? Sensible data are, as we have said, observable
symbols of the property. However, to observe something is in principle
different from observing its symbol. They are distinct actions and could
conceivably exclude one another. To see the word "Dublin" is not to
observe Dublin, even though the word "Dublin" is the symbol of
Dublin. Is then the observable of physics merely the observable
symbol, or is it a real property revealed in some non-metaphorical way
through the observable symbol? One of the aims of
thesis is to
study the various answers given by physicists to this question. Our
answer is that the observable symbol can reveal a real property if it
denotes or indicates the real presence of a variable whose intimate
nature, though not per se representable in sensibility, is known,
however, in some other way and simultaneously. We take the ob
servable symbol to be the criterion of reality for something whose
nature is known only as part of a complex relational totality expressed
symbolically in linguistic or mathematical terms. The something
beyond the symbol to which it refers may be a constructed object
merely immanent to the knower, or the symbolism may go further and
denote a transcendent thing or property. It will
our task to establish
criteria for distinguishing these two cases 1. We call both of them
observation in the symbol", and complex though the description is,
the kind of process we have described is performed continuously and
with ease in daily life; for the use of language is nothing more than to
"observe in the word-symbol" something beyond itself, namely, its
immanent sense or its (transcendent) referent.
The other important element in Heisenberg's insight was the need
he saw to return to the concrete, immediate instance of physical
property as revealed in the data of individual measurements. This
involved a turning away from the rationalism of classical physics with
its criterion of the clear, distinct and abstract idea, and a rediscovery
of reality in the individual, factual instances revealed and mediated
by the act of observation. It was on account of this strong empirical
l(

1 For example, in a language the semantic or
meaning of a word is a term or
object purely immanent to the knowing subject; but its full or ontological meaning generally
refers to a reality transcending the immanent term.
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element – a break with three hundred years of physical tradition – that
quantum mechanics marched on to the stage accompanied by a militant
philosophy of Positivism and Empiricism. However, that was by and
large contrary to the inclinations of Heisenberg, who remained
attached to the old criterion in philosophy and sought a rationalistic
explanation on a deeper level for the indeterminacy and impreciseness
of the new physical object. He found it, as we shall show, in a transcen
dental critique of the new scientific knowledge.

SECTION IV:
QUANTUM MECHANICS,

A NEW KIND OF PHYSICAL THEORY

A Theory of Operators
We shall postpone the inquiry into Heisenberg's ontology and theory
of knowledge to a later chapter. For the moment we shall consider only
the immanent object symbolised on the one hand by its observable
symbol and on the other by its appropriate mathematical sYmbol.
The object called an "observable" was represented in Heisenberg's
first paper by a linear algebraic operator, which Born showed had the
properties of a matrix 1. The eigenvalues of this operator gave the set
of possible values of the observable 2. The set of observables were
defined theoretically in such a way as to preserve a reasonable conti
nuity between classical and quantum
theories in limiting cases.
This latter condition was Bohr's Correspondence Principle which had
been used so successfully in the old quantum theory: we shall return
to this later on. The principal difference between classical physical
theory and quantum mechanical theory was the substitution in
quantum mechanics of a linear operator for the numerical variables
of classical physics.
The observable as a linear operator gave more information than
the corresponding classical variable. I n the first place, its set of
eigenvalues restricted the range of possible numerical values. This
range ceased in every case to be a continuous range, but admitted
discrete values and discontinuous jumps. Both the continuous range
1 M. Born and P . Jordan, "Zur Quantenmechanik", Zeit. f. Physik, XXXIV (1925), pp.
858-888.
2 The linear operator is assumed to be Hermitian and hypermaximal; the former guarantees
that the eigenvalues are real, the latter that it has a soluble eigenvalue equation. Cf., John
von Neumann, The Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, (Princeton: 1955),
pp. 153, 169.
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and the discrete values were calculable, in principle, from the theory.
Secondly, the linear operator, as Born and others were immediately to
show, gave also a probability-distribution governing the ideal frequency
of occurrence of particular values of the observable within a set of
independent observations 1. And finally, since the coordinate ob
servable did not commute algebraically with the corresponding
momentum observable, their probability distributions – but not their
ranges of possible values – were correlated. The derivation of that
correlation, called the Indeterminacy (or Uncertainty) Principle, was
made by Heisenberg in 19272.
Novelty of Quantum Mechanics
Quantum mechanics was a new kind of physical theory. In the first
place, it determined the possible range of values of its own variables,
which classical theory left – except in exceptional cases – to factual
observation. In the second place, it allowed the calculation not merely
of the ideal norm (or expectation value) of sets of concrete data, which
was the aim of classical deterministic theory, but also the manner of
distribution of individual instances about the expectation value. Here
was another radically new result. For, while in a classical deterministic
theory like Newtonian mechanics, concrete measured data are dis
tributed about means randomly, independently of the other variables
and generally according to a Gaussian law (unless there is reason to
assume a different error curve), in quantum
on the other
hand the distributions are random, but not independent, and their
forms depend on the initial boundary conditions as well as on the
equation of development (the Schrödinger equation of the system). In
classical physics, statistical theories are separated from deterministic
theories: the function of the latter being to define by implicit defi
nition the elements and properties of the underlying statistical
ensemble 3. The great originality of quantum mechanics that it both
1 M. Born and P. Jordan, loco cit. Heisenberg attributes the probability-jnterpretation to
Born and Pauli, adding that the idea had also occurred to himself, d., Erinnerungen usw.
d. also P. A.
Dirac, "Physical Interpretation of Quantum Dynamics", Proc. Roy. Soc.,
CXIII (1927), pp. 621-641.
2 W. Heisenberg, "Ueber den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen Kinematik
und Mechanik", Zeit. f. Physik, XLIII (1927), pp. 172-198.
3 Most statistical theories, like statistical thermodynamics, are under some aspects
equivalent to deterministic theories; since the new variables (temperature, entropy, etc.)
are defined implicitly with respect to a set of interrelated variables. The statistical element
enters when these new variables are identified with certain limiting statistical concepts
applied to an underlying ensemble. However, the deterministic part in a classical statistical
theory does not go so far as to define the elements and properties of the underlying ensemble.
~
. •..•
-distinct theory like Newtonian mechanics.
.. -

-

- - - - - - --
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defines the properties of the elements of an ensemble and predicts
their frequency distribution within the ensemble in one formalism.
This involves a double interpretation of the same formulism as we
shall see.
SECTION V:
QUANTUM MECHANICS AND WAVE MECHANICS,

,

''

1926

W ave Mechanics
A rival to quantum mechanics was published by Schrodinger in the
spring of 1926 1. It was a new theory, conceived independently of the
insights of quantum mechanics and capable of being interpreted in a
contrary sense. It was known as Wave Mechanics. It was a very
elegant mathematical theory, based physically upon de Broglie's
notion of a matter wave associated with every particle and employing
in a grand manner that kind of functional analysis developed for
electromagnetic theory which was the crowning glory of traditional
physics. The new theory immediately fired the imagination of physi
cists, while Heisenberg's matrix mechanics left them cold. Schrodinger's
elegant mathematics was of a kind known to and deeply respected by
most physicists: Heisenberg, on the other hand, had been forced to
create a new unfamiliar algebra of repelling abstractness. Furthermore,
Schrödinger appealed directly to the imaginable qualities of waves,
wave packets, of group and phase
which were part of the daily
currency of classical physics 2. Compared with the vividness, elegance
and pictorial quality of Wave Mechanics, matrix mechanics was, as
Schrödinger put it, "von abschreckender ja abstossender Unanschau
lichkeit und Abstraktheit" 3 . Bohr straightaway invited Schrödinger
to Copenhagen and in the autumn of 1926, Heisenberg and Schrödinger
met to discuss their respective viewpoints, with the presence of Bohr
as a moderating influence 4.
Heisenberg and Schrödinger
No rapprochement occurred between the principals. Heisenberg
rejected wave mechanics and Schrodinger rejected quantum mechanics.
Heisenberg argued that wave mechanics was incapable of explaining
E. Schrödinger, Ann. d. Physik, (4) LXXIX (1926), 361; 489; 734; (4) LXXX (1926),437.
For example, E. Schrödinger described the electron as a small wave packet circulating
around the nucleus of an atom in Naturwissen., XIV (1926), p. 664.
3 Quoted by Heisenberg in Zeit. f . Physik, XLIII (1927), p. 195, footnote.
4 N. Bohr, Werner Heisenberg usw., p. x.
1

2
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quantum discontinuities in the microscopic domain. "The more I think
of the physical side of Schrödinger's theory", Heisenberg wrote in the
summer of 1926, "the more I find it abhorrent (abscheulich). Schrö
dinger throws all quantum theory overboard, viz., the photo-electric
effect, Franck collisions, the Stern-Gerlack effect, etc. Under these
conditions, it is not hard to construct a theory" 1. Schrödinger rejected
equally emphatically, Heisenberg's belief in "quantum jumps" and
accused quantum mechanics of being repellingly abstract and un
realistic. Bohr, however, who moderated these discussions, came to the
conviction that both theories must be correct since both gave correct
results, and urged the adoption of a higher viewpoint in which there
was room for both. The name he gave to this higher viewpoint was
complementarity.
Heisenberg, however, remained firm in the conviction that quantum
discontinuities occur in Nature and that they are basic and irreducible
data. On 6 November, 1926, the editor of the Zeitschrift
Physik
received a paper from him entitled "Schwangungerscheinungen und
Quantenmechanik", in which he tried to justify this position 2. He
concludes the paper:
continuous interpretation of the quantum
mechanical formalism – and thus also of the de Broglie-Schrödinger
wave-does not belong to the substance of these relations. Furthermore,
the fact of discontinuities is harmoniously contained i.n the mathe
matical scheme of quantum mechanics". The phrase
not belong
to the substance of [quantum or of wave
means, in the
context, that it cannot be established by observable criteria. One would
find the conclusion a weak one, if one did not share Heisenberg's
master-insight into the nature of physics as a science of observa
bles.
Heisenberg was also stung by Schrödinger's criticisms to defend
his theory from the abstossende Unanschaulichkeit und A bstraktheit of
which it had been accused. During the winter of 1926-1927 Heisenberg
and Bohr discussed their different philosophical
of
quantum mechanics; Bohr wanting to begin from the acceptance of
the complete equivalence of wave and particle pictures, Heisenberg
holding to his rejection of wave mechanics and its unverifiable impli
cations of continuity in Nature. Although these discussions took place
daily and were often protracted into the night, Heisenberg recounts
that "real clarity was not reached", for conflicting conceptual values
1
2

Heisenberg, Erinnerungen usw., p. 44.
Zeit. f. Physik, XL (1927), pp. 501-506.
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(Gedankengut) were involved. "We could not find our way in all these
'matters", was his conclusion 1.
Bohr went off to Norway on a skiing holiday in February, 1927, and
Heisenberg took the opportunity to elaborate and clarify his own views.
These he sent to Pauli who was in substantial agreement with them.
Thus originated one of Heisenberg's most celebrated papers, "Ueber
den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen Kinematik und
Mechanik". It was received by the editor of the Zeitschrift
Physik
on 23 March, 19272. When Bohr returned from his holiday and read
the manuscript, he still disagreed with Heisenberg's method and
starting point. By this time Bohr had elaborated his own interpretation
based upon the Principle of Complementarity, to which we shall return
presently. Heisenberg concluded his account of this period by re
marking that, in spite of philosophical differences, the physical conse
quences of the two interpretations were the same. The note which he
added to the manuscript, in deference to Bohr, indicates the possibility
of a wave-particle interpretation such as that suggested by Bohr.

SECTION VI: THE INDETERMINACY ' RELATIONS OF

1927

The I ntuitive Meaning of Quantum Mechanics
In the celebrated paper in question, Heisenberg tried to explain
what matrix mechanics means to one
criterion of intelligibility
is bound to pictures, images and concrete 'operations. The dominant
idea, as one would expect, is the notion of an observable as dependent
on the possibility of measurement. For example: he explains that the
concept of place involves a reference to the way position is measured
relative to a frame of reference, "anders hat dieses Wort keinen Sinn".
Since the position-measurement of a microscopic particle involves the
exchange of at least one photon with the measuring instrument,
successive position-data for a particle do not lie
a continuous
trajectory, but must be represented as it were by a
of separated
dots on a graph. These are the observables with which physics starts,
and they are discontinuous. There is, consequently, no unique rate of
change, no unique momentum at a point. There is an average for the
short time-interval before the point and a different average generally
for the short interval after the
Hence, exact knowledge of
1

2

Heisenberg,
Zeit. f. Physik,

usw., p. 46, on which this account is based.
XLIII

(1927), pp. 172-198.
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position excludes exact knowledge of momentum at that point. This
kind of explanation Heisenberg calls the anschauliche Deutung, i.e. the
intuitive meaning of quantum mechanics. It consists in a "qualitative"
and in a "theoretical" part, as he says. The theoretical part consists
in understanding that the theory is non-contradictory; the qualitative
part consists in knowing how the data are experimentally obtained.

The Indeterminacy Relations
Assuming that the position coordinate x of an electron has been
measured with a certain degree of accuracy yielding a Gaussian wave
packet, Heisenberg then derives the celebrated Indeterminacy (or Un
certainty) Relation:
Dx.Dp > h

;

1

where Dx is the standard deviation of the statistical distribution of
x-measurements; Dp is the standard deviation of the statistical distri
bution of p-measurements (where p is the momentum in the x-direction),
and h is Planck's constant of action.
All of these points were already implicit in Heisenberg's first paper.
His discussions with Bohr, and especially his passipnate disagreement
with Schrodinger's views, forced him to disentangle some of the
complex and tangled threads of that notion to which he had given the
deceptively simple name of an observable. We have already seen that
the essential core of meaning of this concept is
From the
paper we are considering, it becomes clear
over and above
measurability, quantum mechanics is concerned with the properties of
measured concrete data,' that these include necessarily an interaction
with a measuring instrument: that this interaction is responsible for the
discontinuities of the data (the so-called quantum jumps), and hence
for the indeterminacy of the slope between successive data points.
This account has many surprising aspects. In the first place, it is
clear that the very same statements can be made of any system,
classical or quantum. Successive determinations are always discrete,
discontinuous and affected by what are called "instrumental errors".
If the classical trajectory is smooth and continuous, it is only because
it does not deal directly with concrete data; the smooth curve is a
constructed-theoretical norm whose essential property is that concrete
data do not diverge from it systematically. It has a definite slope at
every point – identified with the classical velocity - only because the
curve is an abstraction. Such an ideal path can also be constructed for
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the quantum mechanical data – it is the plot of expectation values – and
coincides in fact with the classical trajectory. This leads to our first
conclusion, which we have already stated above, that one of the main
differences between classical mechanics and quantum mechanics is that
the fonner gives only the ideal nonn from which concrete data do not
systematically diverge; while quantum mechanics gives, in addition,
fonnulae for the way the statistical distributions of concrete data are
correlated. In other words, . quantum mechanics unites in a single
the functions of both a statistical and a deterministic theory.
The second significant difference between classical and quantum
nlechanics is in the fonn of the Indetenninacy Relations. Indetermi
nacy relations can be constructed in the classical case just as in the case
of quantum mechanics, by taking the product of
standard devi
ations Dx and Dp of the relative departures of x and p from their
classical nonns. In the classical case, the probability distributions of
Dx and Dp are to be taken as independent, and, unless there is good

-

-

reason, Gaussian in form. Then Dx and Dp are independent, and there

--

is no theoretical lower limit to the product Dx. Dp. Of course, if one
were to try to make the concrete data more and more precise, one
should have passed outside the domain of ·validity of classical me
-chanics long before Dx.Dp has reached the value of h. Quantum
mechanics, however, relates the probability distributions of Dx and Dp
to one another and establishes that there is a theoretical lower limit
of h to the product of their standard deviations.

SECTION VII: THE INDETERMIN ACY OF THE FACTU AL

Enriching Abstraction
Some idea of the kind of indetenninacy involved in quantum
mechanics can be drawn from the preceding account; for if one aspect
of quantum mechanics is concerned with concrete data as such, then as
a corollary there is a certain indeterminacy with regard to the momen
tary rate of change of the measured variable. It is the indeterminateness
ot tact that follows from our way of knowing; for our first contact with
the concrete case is through the presentation of sensible symbols. Such
a contact is not yet a knowledge of a thing or an object but merely of a
symbol of it. Comparison with other instances leads to an insight
which is an understanding of what these sense presentations may
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possibly symbolise. This insight we called enriching abstraction, since
it adds to the concrete particularity of the data as not-yet-understood,
the enrichment of an act of understanding expressing an ideal norm
which is essentially the addition of a set of relations between things
or between their symbols. The individual case is then known as a
sample of an ideal norm, in so far as it is a member of an ensemble
of individual cases which do not systematically diverge from the
norm (i.e. which have only random divergence from the norm).
However, the indeterminacy of fact is joined with determinacy of defi
nition; for definition is by concept and in this case it is the ideal norm.
In quantum mechanics the definition is represented by the ob
servable as a linear operator implicitly defined within a consistent
theory and linked to experimental processes by operational definitions.
I t answers the question: how is position, momentum, etc., defined?
The non-commutation of position and momentum operators becomes
part of a new definition (or re-definition vis-à-vis the classical defi
nition) of these which changes the meaning (or sense) of position and
momentum for quantum systems 1. The indeterminacy of fact, however,
answers the question: what is the value of the position and momentum
coordinates of this system here and now? The answer is given by
referring to the results of actual measurements. The indeterminacy of
fact is related to the determinacy of definition, as concrete instance is
to conceptual definition. What is new in quantum mechanics is not
that indeterminacies of variables like position and momentum exist,
but that, being fonnerly thought independent, they are now seen to
be related to one another. The measuring process which enters into the
definition of one disturbs the measuring-process which enters into the
definition of the other. This is the physical significance of the change
in meaning of "position" and "momentum", accomplished by the
quantum mechanical re-definition. Heisenberg then was strictly correct
when he said: "Any use of the words 'position' and 'velocity' with an
accuracy exceeding that given by [the Indeterminacy Relations] is just
as meaningless as the use of words whose sense is not defined" 2.

I gnorance and Nescience
From these considerations there follows our rejection of human
ignorance as the basis of probability laws in physics. Human ignorance
1 This point is stressed by N. R. Hanson in Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge: 1961),
chap. VI, and in Concept of the Positron (Cambridge:
chaps. II -IV. Cf. chap. V, p. 106.
2 Heisenberg, Physical Principles etc., p. 15.

40

DISCOVERY

concerns what we could and should know, but do not know. The
indeterminacy of the factual, however, which states our inability to
increase without limit the number of decimal places in a concrete
determination, belongs in the first place to what we could not know.
Moreover, it is our view that a fully determinate concrete reality is not
expressed by an infinity of decimal places. An ideally exact number is
a concept and hence performs the function merely of an ideal norm.
Finally, we wish to insist that the numbering belongs only to the
observable symbol and not directly to the physical property symbolised
by it. There may be minds capable of knowing the concrete physical
reality in its particularity – perhaps even the human mind in some
poetic or mystic mode of operation can reach it – but the particularity
would not be expressed through the medium of number sets, it would
be a concrete self-revelation of an object in which number possibly has
no part. We propose to call our lack of knowledge of concrete factual
cases nescience instead of ignorance.
Heisenberg does
distinguish between ignorance and nescience,
since he, with practically all physicists, shares the view that a concrete
case is one which is precisely defined in the sense that all its physical
properties possess an infinity of well-determined decimal places.
Consequently, the wave packet which describes the probability distri
bution of the coordinate values is interpreted by him as an expression
of the scientist's ignorance of the real physical state of the particle.
Even though it is evident that there is no concrete determination
which could not be bettered in some way,
do not agree that the
random aspect inescapable from every concrete datum is justly called
ignorance. The data on which a particular physical equation is based
are neither ideal data nor even the best data – if by "best" one means
"with most decimal places" – but merely good data. Good data are data
that respect the fact that only a limited number of decimal places are
significant in any given physical context and concentrates on these.
If a premium is set on the search for more decimal places in every
experimental process, a type of unintelligent
is encouraged
which is the stultification of true scientific work. To be called a "master
of judicious approximation", as was said of Fermi, does not imply
systematic negligence but, on the contrary, excellence of judgement.
We do not mean to deny the value of more and more accurate all-round
experimental measurements, nor do we underestimate the value of
more decimal places in the calculation of an ideal norm. What exists,
however, is not an ideal norm but a concrete sample in which only a
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certain number of decimal places are in fact significant, and to know
how many are significant in fact is a mark of wisdom, and not ignorance 1.
Hence, when Heisenberg states that the dimensions of a wave packet
are determined by the subjective conditions of the knower, viz., his
ignorance, we reply that, on the contrary, it is determined by the kind
of idealization we need to represent the boundary conditions of the
experimental context, namely, of the concrete situation. The wave
packet is our way of expressing (i) the circunlstances under which the
system was prepared and (ii) the objective probabilities, viz., the ideal
frequencies that arise when subsequent measurements are made upon
it. It is not the limitations of our knowledge that specify the wave
packet, but it is rather the fact that the physical events can no longer
be idealised by deterministic correlations in a
classical way.
Initial boundary conditions no longer deternline uniquely (with the
appropriate equations) the results of subsequent but otherwise
arbitrary measurements that might be made upon the system. A new
element has been discovered in the physical situation. Now knowledge
has arisen – not on the basis of ignorance as Heisenberg would suggest
– but on the basis of a more accurate analysis of the data.
What we have just said points to a certain ;inconsistency between
Heisenberg's principle that observables are the matter of physics and
his confused view as to what he thinks physics is really about. This last
is a relic of the rationalism of classical physics which has not been
overcome by the new intentionality implicit
quantum mechanics
of observables.
.
The Relational Structure of Physical Variables
In describing Heisenberg's view above, we stated that some
interaction with a measuring instrument was a necessary consequence
of the observability of a physical property. We now ask the question:
in Heisenberg's view, is the physical property measured by the ob
servable data essentially constituted by the
between
instrument and object, or is the interaction only an accidental but
inescapable means of relating the otherwise imperceptible object to the
scientist's experience?
1 Sir Arthur Eddington has rightly said: "By 'observation' we mean good observation ... ;
'good' is not here taken to mean 'perfect'. By good observation we emphatically do not
mean perfect observation ... The odd thing is that, having made his perfect arrangements,
the perfect observer often fails to accomplish things which to the good observer are quite
elementary". The Philosophy of Physical Science (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Mich. Press, 1958),
pp. 96-97.
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If physics is or ought to be concerned only with the way things
interact with measuring instruments, then the basic observables of
physics are essentially constituted as relations between things and
things, based upon so many different ways in which things act mutually
and reciprocally upon one another. The aim of physics, then, would be
to discover interrelated sets of these activities. This would seem to be
the logical conclusion of Heisenberg's insight. However, Heisenberg
was not able to detach himself sufficiently from the rationalist
background of classical physics to draw this conclusion. In failing to
do so, he spilled from his sails the guiding breeze of his original inspi
ration and so never really fully overcame the encircling restrictions of
the classical intentionality-structure.
This failure led him to retain a parallelistic theory of knowledge, one
different, however, from the naive parallelism characteristic of classical
physics. If the balance illustrates the relational view of physical
science then the microscope illustrates the parallelistic theory of
science. The balance compares an object in one scale with a standard
unit or a fraction of a unit in the other. A microscope on the other hand
merely enlarges the impression the object makes on the eye. The
classical physicist looked for an exact image of what was out there.
Heisenberg accepted this description: the instrument is to man, as he
said, rather as a part of our organism than as a part of external nature
or as the snail's shell is to its occupant 1. He pointed out, however,
that the instrument through which we look
what is out there
and that we see, consequently, not what is
but something which
is in part at least a product of the act of observation. "When we speak
of the picture of nature in the exact science of our age", he wrote, "we
do not mean a picture of nature so much as a picture of
relationships
with nature" 2.
The Wave Packet
In the paper we have been considering, the notion of a wave packet
does not emerge clearly. On the one hand, Heisenberg says that, since
it results in no more than a probability distribution for the position of
the system, it is merely a measure of the scientist's knowledge or lack
of knowledge of the physical system. Because of this, he sometimes
calls the wave packet a probability amplitude or probability wave. On
the other hand, since this "probability wave" was capable of interfering
1
2

Heisenberg, Physicist's Conception etc., p.
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with itself like a light wave, he seems also to consider it as more than
a mere mathematical function.
His final conclusion is that the probability formulae of quantum
mechanics include a reference not only to the kind of experiment which
prepared the state, but also to the kind of experiment which is ultimately
envisaged. By this he means that the development of the wave function
does not describe a process occurring independently of observation, but
that it represents rather a set of incomplete potentialities which need
to be completed by a future act of measurement. He does not discuss
here how the probability wave connects past and future states or
measurements; this was to be one of the central problems of the new
physics. His solution at this stage, in spite of the title of the paper,
tends to be abstractly intellectual in keeping with his original insight.
The course of our epistemological analysis led us back to the views
expressed in this paper. Our own solution was inspired by Heisenberg's
original insight and tries to make it consistent with itself and with a
satisfactory theory of knowledge.
Summary
In this chapter we discussed how Heisenberg's insight of 1925, that
physics should concern itself henceforth only with relations between
observables, changed the intentionality-structure of physics. This insight
led him to the construction of a quantum mechanics of observables.
We discussed briefly the significance of his insigh and of his rej ection
of Schrödinger's wave mechanics; the novelty of quantum mechanics
as a physical theory, and the meaning he attributed to its most
surprising result, viz., the Indeterminacy Relations. We pointed out
that the crisis was a crisis of the rationalism inherent in the outlook
of classical physics, and that Heisenberg's insistence on "observable
quantities" was a return to the individual and empirical manifestations
of reality which as such, to our way of knowing, are penetrated with
a certain random quality.

